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Explaining health system responses to public reporting of cardiac surgery 
mortality in England and the USA. 
 




Public reporting of clinical performance is increasingly used in many countries to 
improve quality and enhance accountability of the health system. The assumption is that 
greater transparency will stimulate improvements by clinicians in response to peer 
pressure, patient choice or competition.  The international diffusion of public reporting 
might suggest greater similarity between health systems. Alternatively, national and 
local contexts (including health system imperatives, professional power and 
organisational culture) might continue to shape its form and impact, implying continued 
divergence. The paper considers public reporting in the USA and England through the 
lens of Scott’s `pillars’ institutional framework. The USA was arguably the first country to 
adopt public reporting systematically in the late 1980s. England is a more recent 
adopter; it is now being widely adopted through the National Health Service (NHS). 
Drawing on qualitative data from California and England, this paper compares the 
behavioral and policy responses to public reporting by health system stakeholders at 
micro, meso and macro levels and through the intersection of ideas, interests, 
institutions and individuals through. The interplay between the regulative, normative and 
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The growing prevalence of discourses on transparency is becoming “irresistible” 
(Marshall et al, 2003, p.145) and being reinforced policy and practice in many health 
systems (Blomgren, 2007; Clarke and Oakley, 2007; Kraska et al, 2016; Levay and 
Waks, 2009; Pelone and Riccardi, 2013; Tu and Cameron, 2003). However, there has 
been limited comparative evidence of the behavioural responses to public reporting by 
health system stakeholders, and explanation of those responses (Marshall et al, 2003) 
and hardly any conceptual analysis of what these developments mean for the medical 
profession or health systems. This paper seeks to remedy those gaps in knowledge in 
relation to public reporting of the outcomes of cardiac surgery in England and California. 
 
The paper is organised into three main sections. First, we examine the emergence and 
development of public reporting as a form of transparency and accountability. We also 
present a conceptual framework of institutional change by which these developments 
may be understood. Second, we present two qualitative case-studies to examine the 
behavioural responses of stakeholders following the inception of public reporting of 
mortality associated with cardiac surgery. These case-studies examine the responses to 
public reporting at the micro, meso and macro levels in the English and Californian 





1.Understanding public reporting in context 
 
In the past two decades, transparency and openness have become commonplace 
features of most health systems. Arguably, the prime example of transparency in health 
systems is the public reporting of (medical or surgical) performance. The dissemination 
of process and/or outcome measures to the public via the internet represents a major 
shift for health system policy-makers, the staff that work in them and the patients treated 
by them. This paper examines the responses by surgeons, health care executives and 
policy-makers to public reporting in England and California. (Patient perspectives are 
not included in this study).  
 
Underlying the emergence of public reporting in health systems is a series of socio-
political and cultural changes (Anon, 2010). First, trust in medical professionals (and the 
wider health system) has been undermined by a series of `scandals’ which have often 
revolved around the way in which (medical) performance is managed, usually by their 
peers (Calnan and Rowe, 2008; Dixon-Woods et al, 2011; Scott and Ward, 2006; 
Timmermans and Oh, 2010). As a result, doctors in many health systems are no longer 
in sole charge of determining standards of (their) performance, monitoring those 
standards and taking action to remedy `poor’ or reward `good’ practice.  
 
Second, advances in information technology have fostered the emergence of public 
reporting. The ability to accumulate, store and disseminate comparative data to public 
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audiences has enabled medical practice to become auditable and comparable (Jeacle 
and Carter, 2011; Power, 1997; Waring and Currie, 2009).  
 
Third, the advent of `new public management’ (in many health systems) has instituted 
new forms of accountability and effectiveness, which are often promulgated by clinical 
hybrid managers (Llewellyn, 2001; Lynn 1998). Neo-liberal policies of `consumer’ 
choice and competition have placed greater emphasis on market-based approaches in 
health systems (Davis et al, 1995). Both choice and competition have had limited 
impacts but have challenged professional ownership of medical performance (Bevan et 
al, 2019; Greener, 2003). Cost containment has also been implicit in discourses of new 
public management and so public reporting has been framed, to some extent, by this. 
Often, this has been described as a search for better value health care (Gray, 2011).    
 
Fourth, the growth of a consumerist culture has “encouraged patients to become 
proactive and informed about the choices they make regarding their health by accessing 
independent knowledge” (Anon, 2012; also Roberts, 1999).  
 
Collectively, these changes have made transparency a normative doctrine in health 
systems; stakeholders `must’ claim the need for greater transparency as if being against 
it would be morally corrupt (Hood, 2007; Meijer, 2009). This is despite questions about 
its definition, implementation and consequences. For example, clinicians could 
manipulate the data and/or their behaviour if incentives become too explicit (Smith, 
1995). Likewise, the surfeit of (often, esoteric) information might also constrain patients 
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in their health-care decision-making (Strathern, 2000; Tsoukas, 1997). Therefore, public 
reporting may not necessarily lead to `improvements’ (Pawson, 2002).  
 
The advent of public reporting has been enabled by these developments but, for it to be 
effective in improving performance, it requires the presence of key factors, namely the 
widespread availability of information on a regular basis and the clear presentation of 
performance rankings (Bevan et al, 2019; Hibbard, 2008). This `programme theory’ of 
public reporting thus relies of four stages: identification, naming, sanction and recipient 
response (Anon, 2010; Pawson, 2002). However, each has potential unintended 
consequences which might subvert the overall effectiveness of public reporting: culprit 
misidentification, dissemination dissimulation, sanction misapplication and unintended 
outcome.  
 
The origins of contemporary public reporting in health-care can be traced back to 
developments in Pennsylvania and New York states in the 1980s (Chassin, 2002; 
Hussey et al, 2014). California represents a particularly advanced example of public 
reporting in the USA (compared to other states), having been in operation for over two 
decades. The diffusion and transfer of this policy within the USA and to other countries 
took place during the 1990s and 2000s (Dolowitz et al, 1999). For example, in recent 
decades, the English health system has become more attuned to US health policy 
developments including public reporting (Anon, 2009; Ham, 2005; Marshall et al, 2000; 
Oliver and Brown, 2011, Walshe, 2001). There has been a notable focus on 
comparisons between the UK and the USA (eg. Bevan and Fasolo, 2013; Anon, 2006; 
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Anon, 2009; Ham, 2005; Oliver and Brown, 2011) and specifically, England and 
California (eg. Feachem et al, 2002). (The English reference here is deliberate since 
greater divergence has been apparent in the devolved nations of the UK (Sanderson et 
al, 2013; Greer, 2008)). By contrast, Scotland was an early pioneer of public reporting in 
the UK (Mannion and Goddard, 2003; Marshall et al, 2003)).  
 
It is significant that cardiac surgery has been at the forefront of public reporting 
initiatives in the US and UK. Some see it as a highly prestigious specialty of medicine 
(Creed et al, 2010; Katz, 1998) and yet is also open to greater measurability (compared 
to other specialties)(Harrison, 2002).  
 
Descriptive accounts of public reporting are valuable but they also need to be explained 
conceptually. The case of cardiac surgery might be comparable but the framing and 
implementation of public reporting needs to be understood better, both now and in the 
future for other health systems. Here, we seek to do that by hypothesising whether two 
contrasting case-studies might be converging towards a generic model of public 
reporting or diverging along separate lines.  Convergence would indicate a form 
institutional isomorphism (Beckert, 2010) whereas divergence would point towards path 
dependency (Greener, 2005). A useful way to interpret this in terms of Scott’s (2008) 
institutional pillars. This approach is consistent with wider institutional theory which 
posits institutions as the array of interests and ideas, norms and practices as well as 
formal structures and rules (Alvesson and Spicer, 2019). Scott’s notion of institutional 
pillars is insightful as it argues that institutions comprise regulative, normative and 
7 
 
cultural-cognitive elements, which Scott termed `pillars’ (Brunton, 2017; Checkland et al, 
2012; Muzio et al, 2013). The pillars are not mutually exclusive; they interact together so 
that each shapes and is shaped by the behaviours by individuals and groups, at 
different institutional levels – at the clinical-patient interface, at organisational levels, 
and at policy/institutional levels. The pillars are thus useful heuristic devices, 
transcending institutional boundaries. The regulative pillar refers to the espoused rules 
and sanctions of the institution, as pronounced in policy documents or legislation. The 
normative pillar comprises the standards and principles of institutional practices; this 
implies the expected duties and obligations of (say) surgeons in conducting their clinical 
practice. The cultural-cognitive pillar addresses the deeply seated assumptions and 
beliefs underlying actions; such “symbolic systems” of the profession might, for 
example, confer reputational effect on public reporting (Shekelle et al, 2008). This 
framework can explain institutional patterns of change, especially those which are often 
portrayed as clashes between dominant and challenging logics, such as managerialism 
and professionalism (Ocasio et al, 2017). These pillars have the advantage of 





The behavioural and policy responses to public reporting (in the form of mortality rates 
associated with individual named surgeons) are now examined empirically, drawing at 
on data collected at the micro, meso and macro levels in the context of California and 
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England. (This replicates Adler and Kwon’s (2013) distinction between individual, 
organisation and institution, as well as the inter-connected nature of Scott’s `pillars’ 
framework). The micro level refers to surgeons’ views and behaviour (Barr et al, 2008; 
Hannan et al, 1997); hospitals which provided cardiac surgery were either large, multi-
speciality centres or (smaller) units dedicated to surgery. The meso level to managerial 
decision-making processes (Dranove et al, 2003); and the macro level to the external 
regulatory and policy environment (Anon, 2012). This multi-level approach helps gauge 
the degree of enrolment and resistance to public reporting among surgeons, health care 
executives and health policy-makers, as well as the interactions between different levels 
and stakeholders in the health system. (Other studies have considered the impact of 
public reporting on outcomes; eg. Behrendt, and Groene, 2016; Bridgewater et al, 
2007).  
 
Two separate studies were conducted to investigate the responses to public reporting 
amongst institutional agents, their use of the data and consequences. The micro level of 
the English study involved one hospital and its local organisational and managerial 
setting (meso). The macro level comprised the external regulatory and policy 
environment which would affect all similar hospitals. Data collection entailed (sixteen) 
interviews with senior and junior surgeons, data analysts, (hospital and purchaser) 
managers, regulators and policy-makers (some of whom were surgeons). The interview 
sample was selected by virtues of their position, role and/or involvement in public 
reporting; this was identified by the head of surgery department (as a key informant), 
documentary evidence and observation. (Additionally, the English case-study comprised 
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participant-observation of surgeons in (ten) morbidity and mortality (M&M) meetings and 
in daily practice (over two days); given the comparative aspect of this article, these data 
are not used here). The USA study undertook a similar approach albeit in one state 
(California). It is hard to generalise across the diversity of the USA but California has 
previously proven to be a useful comparator of the UK or England (eg. Hussey et al, 
2014; McDonald and Roland, 2009). At the micro and meso levels, (ten) interviews were 
held with practising surgeons in two hospitals, data analysts at state level, regional 
purchasers and health service researchers. These individuals were identified with the 
aid of an academic researcher based in California, and documentary evidence. The two 
hospitals were selected because of the contrasting organisational status; one comprised 
a large health plan and the other was an independent organisation. The macro level 
was different in that federal health policy has a different resonance in each state; 
therefore, macro level interviews were not undertaken. Instead, corroborative evidence 
from policy documentation and published research was garnered. Interviews in both 
case-studies involved similar questions (box 1 and 2); interview were semi-structured, 
allowing supplementary questions to probe answers in more depth. Interview questions 
were derived from a programme theory of public reporting (Anon, 2010), which sought 
to identify behavioural responses in terms of how public reporting should and does work 
in practice as well as the consequences (intended and otherwise) for different 




Box 1: Interview schedule for California participants 
1. Describe your job in relation to California Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Outcomes 
Reporting Program (CCORP)  
2. What would you describe as the key aspects of CCORP which have been 
instrumental in its uptake by clinicians and organisations? 
3. Would you like to see CCORP changed? 
▪ Expanded, eliminated, refocused, new measures 
4. How are your analyses of CCORP data being used beyond public reporting? 
▪ Eg. Pay-for-performance, quality improvement, health plan designation of 
cardiac centers of excellence. 
5. What other strategies are being used to manage surgical performance and 
improve it? 
6. What might CCORP have achieved in the next 2 to 5 years?  
7. Have you (or your organisation) encountered resistance by clinicians or hospitals 
to report data?  
8. What have been the unintended consequences from CCORP? 
9. What has been the impact of CCORP upon surgeons in training? 
 
Box 2: Interview schedule for England participants 
1. How was poor surgical performance monitored before (personally and within the 
profession, their experience)?   
2. What has been your role in implementing public reporting (locally / nationally)? 
3. What discussions with colleagues took place locally about public reporting? 
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4. What were staff concerns about implementing public reporting? 
5. Has there been any resistance to public reporting? 
6. What has been the impact of public reporting upon relationships with staff, with 
managers, with external agencies? 
7. How has public reporting affected surgical work? 
 
 
In both studies, patients were not included in the data collection because the focus of 
inquiry was upon professional and institutional responses to public reporting. Also, the 
resources available to both studies precluded the inclusion of patients. Even though 
evidence suggest limited use of public reporting data by patients (Fung et al, 2008; 
Marshall et al, 2003), patient perspectives remain significant because they are liable to 
change in the light of IT advances, previous patient behaviour and health system 
incentives. They are, however, beyond the scope of this article. 
 
All interviews (except one) were audio-recorded (with permission) and transcribed. 
Interviews lasted 45-75 minutes. Contemporaneous, observational field-notes were 
written in full. Analysis of interview transcripts and observational field-notes was 
undertaken in a similar way for both studies; this involved researchers reading and 
coding transcripts initially before their widespread application. As the English case-study 
was conducted before the Californian one (and despite the contextual differences), 
there were fewer discrepancies in the coding process for the latter. A software 
programme was not used to analyse transcripts given the relatively small sample size. 
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The ‘framework’ approach guided the data search for commonalities and differences, 
thus identifying themes within and between different levels (Gale et al, 2013; Ritchie 
and Spencer 1994). We drew descriptive inferences based on a priori and emergent 
themes before applying them to Scott’s conceptual perspective. In what follows, we 
present our findings in terms of micro, meso and macro levels, each with sub-themes. 
Interviewee names have been anonymised.  
 
A number of limitations are manifest in this comparative study. First, the complexity of 
the study (viz. two case-studies, 3 levels of empirical data) militates against a more 
extensive account within the scope of the journal. Second, a longitudinal study would 
have helped to gauge the ways in which public reporting has evolved. Some data offers 
a corroborative perspective but this is inevitably partial. Third, a more extensive data 
collection could have given a more rounded assessment. More staff (eg. nurses) and 
patients could have been interviewed but the focus of both case-studies was on the 
changing nature of medical professionalism. More observational data would also have 
provided more depth of insight. These factors illustrate the limitations of the study and 





● Micro level: 
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In both studies, some surgeons opposed the ways in which surgery is measured and 
data were attributed to named individual surgeons. Initially, they did so in a mix of 
passive and active resistance, especially where individual/organisational reputation was 
at stake; this has become more muted over time. In England, all respondents noted that 
some surgeons remained resistant to public reporting although others surgeons were 
more accepting, as illustrated by Derek and Ralph. 
 
“There are quite a few dissenting voices yeah, quite a few, the laggards for want 
of a better word, decent people…” (Derek, surgeon and regulator, England). 
 
“There's also an aspect to which having the results published has been cathartic 
and we've done it, we’ve been there, you know. Any fall out has happened, we've 
done it over a number of years now and I think people are quite relaxed about it” 
(Ralph, surgeon, England). 
 
Public reporting had even prompted resistance in the form of resignations from the 
surgeons’ professional body. 
 
“This whole issue has been quite controversial and in some areas, some 
members have actually resigned from the Society” (Larry, surgeon and 
professional leader, England). 
 




“Surgeons have been resistant to measurement” (Arthur, researcher, California). 
 
Resistance concerned the unit of analysis in both forms of public reporting. Naming of 
individual surgeons within specific hospitals, it was argued, gave misleading inferences 
about team-based care. 
 
“There's a lot of push-back [by surgeons to public reporting] which we are 
philosophically sympathetic to because if you really believe in team care and 
integrated care and co-ordination – all that stuff,  picking individual physician as a 
unit of analysis is kind of silly” (Daniel, purchaser, California). 
 
However, Californian respondents thought practicing surgeons had become more 
accepting of public reporting over time. This might be gauged by the falling numbers of 
appeals made to the state-wide body overseeing the public reporting. 
 
“So we've been through it [appeals by surgeons] three times and it's [numbers 
appealing] gone down each time. The first time we probably had about in the 
twenties. We learned a lot. People were appealing things that it affected their 
ratings... and the next time it was less and then this last time which was two 




A central concern at the micro level was whether public reporting was voluntary or 
mandatory. Public reporting schemes have mostly shifted from voluntary to mandatory 
disclosure. In California, public reporting (California Mortality Reporting Program; 
CMRP) was initially voluntary at the hospital level (Parker and Damberg, 2005).  
 
“About 25 to 30% of hospitals did not participate but this was largely because 
they were not STS [Society for Thoracic Surgeons] members and did not have to 
computer software to enable them to report mortality data” (Jack, data analyst, 
California).  
 
However, by 2005 report, non-participation was 36% (Parker and Damberg, 2005, p.3). 
In the early-mid 2000s, coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) reporting in California 
became compulsory (California CABG Outcomes Reporting Program; CCORP) with the 
passage of legislation (Senate Bill 898 in 2001)(Lee and Carlisle quoted in Parker and 
Damberg, 2005, p.v). The concern that public reporting would be mandated (and thus 
introduce greater regulation of surgeons) had been recognised at the outset. 
 
“I know when I was in New York, in the mid '80s going to early '90s that the 
whole discussion was even the validity of a database, the participation of a 
database and one of the main attacks on having this database that it would be 




In England, voluntary participation has been prized by the surgical specialty which  
secured surgeons’ participation as public reporting moved from an internal educational 
exercise to external audiences (Anon, 1998; Keogh et al, 2004). According to two 
English respondents, about one sixth of cardiac surgeons did not disclose their mortality 
rates in the 2000s. Indeed, as one English respondent commented: 
 
“[The regulator] never ever said that publication of individual surgeon’s results 
should be mandatory” (Barry, surgeon and policy-maker, England).  
 
The fear expressed by most English surgeons was that reporting would become 
mandatory and linked to more explicit control of their practice, with a loss of clinical 
autonomy. 
 
“I think these things [public reporting] are very good when used internally and 
professionally.  However, when these figures go in the so-called public domain, I 
think this is where I feel a little bit uncomfortable with, because then… the data 
needs a lot of knowledge to interpret it, to understand it” (Tim, junior surgeon, 
England). 
 
By 2013, the re-launch of public reporting in 10 specialties referred to a high(er) degree 
of participation in England. Regarding this initiative, Bridgewater (2013) cites legal 
advice, indicating that individual results should not be published without individual 
surgeons' consent. However, he claims that data about non-participating doctors will be 
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relayed to local executives and purchasers but not to the public. He, nonetheless, 
reassures that consent rates are “more than 96%”; hence, non-participation appeared to 
have to fallen to 4%. 
 
The use of publicly reported data by patients in their decision-making varied by 
circumstance and context between England and California. In both case-studies, 
surgeons commonly stated that patients did not use the data. 
 
“My experience is that very few patients tend to come and want to discuss the 
results or discuss the stuff on the website” (Rupert, surgeon, England). 
 
“Public reporting has not, in my mind in the last 5 years, has not really affected 
patient behavior and it hasn't really affected cardiology referring. …Over the last 
5 years,… one of the things that we worried about… is that when we share this 
data, patients aren't going to come and see me. That's not borne out. 
Cardiologists don't see this data. I mean they see it but send the patient. Their 
human behavior is that they know that the high risk and they continue to send 
[patients] to you” (Henry, surgeon, California). 
 
These views corroborate the conclusions of Marshall et al (2003) and Shekelle et al 
(2008) in reviews of extant evidence, mainly from the USA. (This would also explain the 
apparent `failure’ of naming and shaming schemes in England; Bevan et al, 2019). 
However, the reasons diverge. The English policy of `patient choice’ (which encouraged 
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patients to select between `competing’ hospitals) had a mixed uptake (Fotaki, 2006; 
Greener, 2003).  Moreover, cardiac surgery is a tertiary service and requires referral 
from a cardiologist, so patient choice is less relevant (and another reason for their 
exclusion from this study). In California, patients’ decision-making is heavily mediated 
by the institutional rules of their health insurers. Jerry described one patient from a 
nearby town who wanted to be treated at his facility. 
 
“Their insurance won't pay for it. So the people are trapped by their insurances 
much more so in the State of California than any other state. So a great example 
is [the town’s] hospital that has a very low [volume of patients]…and even if they 
wanted to leave there, the majority of patients in that area can't leave. They're 
trapped by their insurance” (Jerry, surgeon, California). 
 
Although the `exit’ strategy was less available (compared to the voice and loyalty 
strategies)(Hirschman, 1970) in California and England, there are signs of patients 
becoming less reliant on traditional sources of information about clinical performance 
(Tritter, 2009). 
 
“25% of patients that I did last year came to me independent of their primary care 
doctors or their cardiologists' recommendation. Well, it was 90% just a decade 




It had been feared that public reporting might dissuade surgeons from operating on high 
risk patients, afraid that their reported outcomes would be `worse.’ However, whilst 
recognising that risk-taking was inherent in surgery, English and Californian surgeons 
presented a narrative which balanced clinical need against low trust in the data. 
 
“It [treating a high risk patient] would affect my published performance number, 
so yeah, so it would just make me unhappy. But it would not stop me doing it, 
and the reason I say it is because of the risk algorithms we have are relatively 
poor” (Damon, surgeon, England). 
 
“Some surgeons, probably younger ones, are keeping track of how they're doing. 
They are probably maybe less willing to take on a patient if they think it's going to 
push them into a poor performance category… There is avoidance of certain 
patients and it's more subtle than the data can turn out” (Jack, data analyst, 
California). 
 
This reasoning moderates any reputation effect of public reporting because the 
surgeon’s peers would tacitly acknowledge the limitations of algorithms of case-mix 
adjustments. This might invoke the notion of equality of competence in a contemporary 
form (Causer and Exworthy, 1999).  
 
● Meso level: 
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In England, hospital executives reported that public reporting was loosely connected to 
organisational imperatives such as quality improvement or cost control. Executives 
seemed initially content to allow surgeons to develop their own professionally-led 
initiatives.  
 
“We’ve [hospital administration] tended to dip in and out of things… So we’ve 
done mortality in isolation and we’ve looked at rates of complaints or something. 
We’ve never quite brought the whole thing together to really use it to help 
improve what we’re doing rather than just measure non-compliance [of public 
reporting]” (Dave, senior executive, England). 
 
Executives noted the need for greater transparency and that this could be 
advantageous to their organisation in future. Whilst such comments may have over-
stated the impact of public reporting, it does signal the thinking of executives in how 
these data could be used. 
 
“I know that when [former chief executive officer of the case-study hospital] - his 
view was that we should publish it [data] because in the world of the Foundation 
Trusts [ie. more autonomous NHS organisations] and free [patient] choice, 
extended choice, you know, to be that hospital which is open and honest about 
its mortality rates, even if the public actually probably don't understand [the data], 





More recently, public reporting has seemingly stimulated efforts within organisations to 
improve quality, a process which was probably more advanced in California than 
England, according to respondents. This was a recognition that the focus of public 
reporting was shifting towards health-care systems and away from individual surgeons.   
 
“I’m not a fan of individual surgeon [level reporting]; I think it is clinical teams. 
And the other point I wanted to make… when organisations fail, 99 times out of a 
100 it’s managerial, it isn’t clinical” (Barry, surgeon and policy-maker, England). 
 
“I think the fundamental issue... I think almost always the problem is not the 
person, it's the system that let the person down and ...that's what we concentrate 
on. We don't try to sling blame. We try to concentrate on trying to improve the 
system... to make it possible for a person, any person to succeed.  I always say 
that you could put anybody in my job right here right now and they would 
succeed without a question” (Jerry, surgeon, California). 
 
Bevan et al (2019) argue a similar point by suggesting that trust and altruism are 
suitable for improvements sought at an individual level but ill-suited for systemic 
improvements. 
 
By contrast, the Californian hospitals in this study were using publicly reported data in 
aid of quality improvement and service re-organisation. The initial `loose coupling’ 
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between hospital executives and surgeons was now becoming more integrated 
(Kitchener et al, 2005). This coupling challenged the viability of surgical programs with a 
low volume of surgery, for example. 
 
“One mortality at a small programme [hospital] can make you bad and they think 
it's going to be a punitive measure rather than just trying to elevate their entire 
programme” (Jerry, surgeon, California). 
 
Jerry cited examples where “those [surgical] programmes were really forced to close” as 
a result of public reporting. He claimed that “most of the programmes they need to be 
closed are closed already” meaning that the focus was shifting towards quality 
improvement, rather than removing low volume centers. Surgeons recognised the 
influence of organisational systems upon their surgical practice and public reporting. 
One chief surgeon explained this regarding his and another hospital within the local 
area where he worked. 
 
“We're in a very similar healthcare model, which is a capitated, integrated 
management system, not only from physicians but with hospital… We're 
comparing similar patients..., we have similar electronic records…  It makes more 
sense to compare data and our outcomes in that way as opposed to us 
comparing to [another local, independent hospital]. How can you compare and 
then come to any reasonable conclusions because their population's different, 
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their machines are different, their technology's different and so their products will 
be different. Their outcomes will be different” (Henry, surgeon, California). 
 
However, other Californian hospitals did not work this way. Another surgeon explained 
the consequences of the different hospital system in which he worked: 
 
“25% of my patients have no insurance and now for the [Californian] state that's 
true, for heart surgery. [Hospital X] has zero, so it's a completely different 
model… No homeless person ever goes to [hospital X]. They have been trained 
to go to [public hospital Y]. So it was 18% in 2010 for [public hospital Y] of 
cardiac surgery which was not reimbursed at all… If you don't have insurance, 
the chance that you're going to need, you know, for the first 30 days - the care is 
rehab facilities, visiting nurses, all those don't exist for 18% of the patients at 
[public hospital Y]. [Public hospital Y] has to eat it.” (Jerry, surgeon, California). 
 
Note that each surgeon highlighted different aspects. Henry noted the benefits of an 
integrated system while Jerry pointed to its impacts of exclusionary approaches.  
 
Linking reimbursement claims data to public reporting had generated controversy in 
California. According to one respondent, one such initiative in 2008 had created a “huge 
firestorm of opposition and conflict within the state” and had led to “law suits and 
litigation and political stuff that was very debilitating for everybody” (Daniel, purchaser, 
California). In the US, such financial incentives have arguably been more extensively 
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developed than in England (Farrar et al, 2009; McDonald and Roland, 2009; Rosenthal 
and Dudley, 2007) which have generated some resistance amongst surgeons. 
 
“If there's… money attached to it, or referrals or some other financial impact, then 
there's going to be a lot more contention about how my named data appears on 
the ranking” (Daniel, purchaser, California). 
 
There had been similar pressures (and some progress) to link publicly reported data to 
reimbursement at a system or organizational level.  Note, for example, Dave’s comment 
(see above) about `doing mortality in isolation’ or the English initiative linking quality 
improvement to additional financial reimbursement, called CQUINs (commissioning for 
quality and innovation) (Murray, 2017). However, in the past few years, emphasis has 
been on financial constraints associated with austerity (Charlesworth et al, 2016).  
 
In both case-studies, hybrid `surgeon-executives’ helped to broker the interests of 
surgeons and the wider institutional context.  
 
● Macro level: 
At this systemic level, we examine the role of the profession, the impact of the media, 
and the salience of mortality as the publicly-reported measure. 
 
First, the surgical profession was instrumental in promoting the introduction of publicly 
reported surgical data in England but less so in California. In England, some of the 
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former leaders of the profession have become senior figures in the health ministry 
(Department of Health) and the health-care regulator (Care Quality Commission). Their 
professional interest in and development of surgical audit in the 1990s transferred to a 
wider audience initially in cardiac surgery in the 2000s and subsequently to other 
specialties (from 2013).  These English surgical leaders sought to accommodate 
external pressures (such as patient choice and competition) with the specialty’s 
members’ interests. However, this accommodation had strained the cohesion of the 
specialty.  The leaders (who were supportive of public reporting) tried to maintain 
collegiality with surgeons (some of whom were resistant). 
 
“I don’t draw a distinction between myself and my colleagues. I am still a surgeon 
I am not a… bureaucrat” (Barry, surgeon and policy-maker, England). 
 
Another English senior surgeon recognised the need to foster public reporting whilst 
stressing the continued need for professional ownership of it. 
 
“So we have to have some sort of measurement and far better that we do it and 
do it professionally and well, than have it imposed on us... I suppose some 
people would feel it’s being imposed on us but …I would reject that. I think we 
are still leading the way with it and we get other people to help us with it… I know 
there’s a bit of resentment, certainly amongst our members, that we’re 
scrutinising ourselves so closely and indeed, being scrutinised from outside.” 




Decisions about the form and scope of public reporting had involved the surgical 
specialty which enabled it to retain significant control.   
 
“I do very much agree with a point that performance needs to be monitored, 
because without monitoring of performance… then you don’t really have an 
accurate idea as to where you’re going, whether you’re going through a difficult 
period, a bad patch” (Ikram, junior surgeon, England)   
 
However, the surgical profession in California was much less involved in the inception of 
public reporting. Unlike England, it was not the Californian surgical profession which 
engaged initially but rather the California Medical Association and the cardiologists. 
 
“Now at that point they [the Californian state] had to engage the professional 
communities. Interestingly they did not go to the Society of Thoracic Surgeons; 
they went to the... California Chapter of the American College of Cardiology who 
in some ways are their competitors, right, and they went to the California Medical 
Association” (Jack, data analyst, California).  
 
Respondents noted that Californian cardiac surgeons were less cohesive as a 
profession and did not engage with the state-led initiative into public reporting. The 
surgeons did subsequently become more involved. Respondents in California 
suggested that the state’s public reporting has been prompted by experience elsewhere 
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in the US rather than a surgeon-led initiative. One recounted how a purchaser in the 
state instigated public reporting. 
 
“They [purchasers] said back in the- the 90s- 95 or 96 so, this sort of thing `New 
York's been doing it successfully. We're a huge state, there's a lot of people here 
getting bypass surgery in California. We should be-you know the west coast 
should be able to do what the east has done’, and so they put some money, you 
know, into that argument” (Jack, data analyst, California). 
 
Indeed, the larger states (such as New York or California) have had the resources and 
capability to undertake programmes of public reporting unlike smaller states.  
 
Second, the role of the media, often using freedom of information, has been 
instrumental in introducing public reporting. In New York State, for example, Newsday 
magazine published hospital data whilst in England, the Guardian newspaper adopted a 
similar approach (Hannan et al, 1994; Keogh et al, 2004). Media-led public reporting 
seemed to accelerate developments; indeed, one respondent explained that surgeon-
led initiatives were over-taken by the Guardian’s strategy: 
 
“We were boxed into it [public reporting]…we were into trying to get good 
measurements of results for individual units; what then happened was we were 





However, in California, the impetus for public reporting was driven less by any particular 
media concern (as in New York). Initial interest there was sparked by a purchaser group 
(Pacific Business Group on Health; PBGH) who, in 1995, collaborated with the State-
wide office for health planning. The Californian media were initially interested but since 
then, however, the urgency of public reporting for them has waned over the years. One 
respondent `measured’ the decline in interest by column inches in the newspaper:   
 
“We... issued this report in April and we had- how many press calls?  Even with a 
brand new measure in here [in the report] which we kind of think, 'Oh we'll add 
another- another outcome measure' –keep it fresh, and we have less press calls 
than we ever had” (Hannah, data analyst, California). 
 
This decline was corroborated by a surgeon: 
 
“My last interview was when the last report came out…. I gave an interview to 
[local newspaper], you know - page 10, small paragraph. You know the 
newspapers are done with this topic. So it's not getting any publicity per se. It 
should be news but it's not. The people are burnt out from it, they hear the data 
all the time, they're burnt out from it” (Jerry, surgeon, California). 
 
The `light’ of transparency, shone by the media, may not necessarily generate 
continuing improvements in health-care quality (cf. Tsoukas, 1997). Even over a decade 
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ago, Chassin (2002) claimed that “press coverage, so copious at the outset of the 
programme, is waning. A Lexis-Nexis search in April 2002 revealed no newspaper 
reports on the most recent public release of CSRS [cardiac surgery reporting system] 
data in January 2001” (p.49)(cf. Huesch et al, 2014).  
 
Third, common to both case-studies was the measure of mortality rates for named 
individual surgeons working within specific hospitals. In England, the (30 day post-
operative) mortality rate for CABG (the main surgical procedure) was 1.6% in the 40 UK 
surgical centres (2008-2009) (http://heartsurgery.cqc.org.uk/Survival.aspx). In 
California, the “observed mortality rate” for `isolated CABGs’ (involving no other 
procedure) by hospital was 2.24% in the 120 hospitals (undertaking CABG 
surgery)(2007-2008) (http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Clinical_Data/CABG/07-
08Breakdown.html). Such rates have been falling before and since public reporting. 
However, it was the use of the rate and its symbolic value which were significant here. 
 
“Mortality rates are really for the bad apples” (Craig, surgeon, England). 
 
“The surgeon has a responsibility to the programme to say, 'Well, you know, if we 
chuck up all these high mortalities and let you go, then we may be fined or shut 
down or penalised’” (Henry, surgeon, California). 
 
The 30 day period of measurement was problematic since, in some hospitals, patients 




“Why we're using operative mortality as the only indicator of publicly reported to 
me is a complete mystery” (Daniel, purchaser, California). 
 
In California, the mandated use of the `isolated CABG’ mortality rate has, some 
respondents claimed, caused difficulties. Reductions in mortality rates and a decline in 
the number of CABG procedures meant this was a less relevant measure.  
 
“One thing that has kind of maybe pushed this a little more into the spotlight is just 
recently the in-hospital mortality rate for PCI [percutaneous coronary intervention, or 
angioplasty] has inched above the in-hospital mortality rate for isolated CABG” 
(Hannah, data analyst, California). 
 
“With deep sternal wound infection, it's measured over a 30-day period so somebody 
may be discharged 5 days after surgery but the surgeon is still responsible for their 
patient for the 25 days post discharge and during that period of time they, you know,  
the patient's ability to manage their wound effectively is compromised” (Eric, quality 
improvement facilitator, USA). 
 
“We're down the 1-2% range [of mortality]. It doesn't discriminate performance of the 
variable that people are concerned about when they undertake the treatment” 




English surgeons echoed concerns with mortality as a performance measure. However, 
despite these concerns, they too continued to use it.  
 
“I think it's [mortality rate] not a panacea that some of its advocates would 
suggest… Mortality's often inappropriate because it's just not very discriminatory 
you know, when things are low… but in a lot of cases, yes, you'll have a 1 or 2% 
mortality rate…  Actually what does it tell you if somebody's got a 10% mortality 





By comparing the behavioural responses of stakeholders at micro, meso and macro 
levels in case-studies of public reporting in California and England, it has been possible 
to discern the extent to which these two health systems have been converging. Patterns 
of convergence were evident (around measurement and the use of data) but equally, 
strong differences persisted (especially regarding professional and institutional 
interests). In each case, the interaction between ideas and interests of institutions and 
individuals generated the observed outcomes. Beyond description, these findings 
require explanation; Scott’s (2008) Pillars framework is thus instructive here.  
 
The regulative pillar contrasts the legislative approach of California (which mandated 
state reporting of surgical mortality) with the (initially) professionally-led strategy in 
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England. These approaches somewhat constrained health systems from moving over 
time towards more relevant measures of surgical performance. Californian public 
reporting had also been initiated by purchasers’ concerns for the comparative value of 
health care spending between providers whereas purchasers (commissioners) in 
England had taken a much more detached role, preferring instead to allow health care 
providers (ie. Hospitals) to manage the process. In the English case-study, the medical 
profession was largely in control of how performance was measured and the data were 
used.  
 
Sanctions for `poor’ performance were apparent mainly in California with purchasers 
removing low volume, poor quality providers. Fewer explicit sanctions were evident in 
England.  However, the incentives for `outstanding’ performance were much less 
distinct, as public reporting often was primarily concerned with `moving performance 
from awful to adequate’ (Bevan et al, 2019). Regulators and policy-makers in both 
cases were seeking to address similar challenges of health system performance and 
were increasingly using public reporting to do so. Public reporting had become a 
normative doctrine in both case-studies.  While other measures (such as financial 
control) were used to address these challenges (especially in England), public reporting 
offered a seemingly robust and easily comparable performance measure (namely, 
mortality). However, in both cases, data quality undermined the ability to manage 
surgical performance, at least initially. Moreover, the salience of public reporting has 
lessened as mortality rates have improved over time (thereby reducing variations 
between the `best’ and `worst’ surgeons, and emphasising further need to consider 
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other measures such as patient experience). As a result, public and media interest has 
waned. California’s earlier experience of public reporting offers a dynamic picture of 
public reporting over time and thus offers a perspective upon the trajectory of public 
reporting in England. Some convergence had taken place but distinct differences 
remained.  
 
Regards the normative pillar, the institutional imperative to public reporting appeared 
strong in both cases (especially as surgeons’ participation became mandatory in both 
cases).  In California, the institutional pressure came from the State and the purchaser 
group, with surgeons playing a minor role in framing the scope and remit of public 
reporting. Yet, once introduced, surgeons were involved in public reporting as a means 
towards improving the quality of services.  In England, surgeons’ leaders recognised the 
need to foster ownership of public reporting; surgical leaders in the specialty and in 
policy-making were crucial mediators between surgeons and institutional interests. 
These leaders facilitated the introduction of public reporting. Although such approaches 
might indicate an awareness among the medical profession of the potential for greater 
external control, they do also denote a re-professionalisation of medicine which sought 
to reset the position and status of surgeons vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Such re-
professionalisation was marked by the emphasis on accountability (redolent of 
managerialism) and new forms of engagement with patients (qua consumers) (Elston, 
2009). Regards the first of these, health care executives were connecting public 
reporting with institutional imperatives (such as pay-for-performance) but the use of 
such data in quality improvement was variable. This was more prevalent in California 
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than England. Secondly, the use of these data by patients was hardly apparent in either 
case-study. Patients rarely used the data and the public voice featured little. Media 
reports took increasingly scant notice of the data. This may be exacerbated by the 
esoteric measure of surgical performance (ie. adjustment of mortality rates according to 
high risk patients) and whose dissemination is often opaque. Suddaby and Viale (2011) 
argued that while the profession has sometimes been instrumental in devising and 
disseminating measures of `their’ members’ performance, often for reasons of public 
interest, such measures tended to be understood largely only by the professionals 
themselves.  Moreover, the partial use of publicly reported data may help explain 
behavioural responses which underlined the `reputation pathway’ as being likely to 
generate most improvement in mortality rates (Hibbard et al, 2003), as opposed to a 
selection (by patients) pathway. 
 
As for the cultural-cognitive pillar, the `transparency doctrine’ appeared relentless in 
both cases. Initial resistance to public reporting by surgeons had been evident in both 
cases but this was declining. Evidence presented here showed hardly any overt 
resistance to the notion of transparency by surgeons. This reflected a shift in which 
participation had initially been voluntary but had become mandatory. In some ways, this 
might increase the incentive for gaming (eg. avoiding high risk patients) if there were 
more explicit penalties for `poor’ performance (Smith, 1995). Moreover, most surgeons 
and their professional leaders in both cases sought to incorporate public reporting into 
their norms of professionalism (eg. as a tool of quality improvement) and thereby deflect 
possible external threats to their autonomy.  Although public reporting did enrol most 
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surgeons, participation was sometimes begrudging; minimal resistance was thus 
apparent (Westaby, 2014). If done begrudgingly, this suggests that public reporting did 
not fully match surgeons’ own professional logics (ie. autonomy and self-interest). As 
public reporting in England had been pioneered by the surgeon’s own professional 
body, this dissonance was perhaps less marked in England compared with California. In 
any case, it appeared to be leading towards a greater re-stratification within the 
profession between the knowledge elite (generating the evidence and devising case-mix 
adjustments), the administrative elite (applying the doctrine of public reporting in terms 
of incentive regimes) and rank-and-file surgeons (who were the object of and subject to 
public reporting)(Freidson, 1994; Miller, 1992).   
 
Overall, although public reporting was implemented in different ways at different time 
points, there were some signs of apparent convergence in the process and outcomes of 
public reporting in both cases. Surgeons in both cases were increasingly aligned with 
the institutional aims and practice of public reporting. It had become not only a `system 
logic’ (Tuohy, 1999) but possibly also an “electronic panopticon”, providing continuous 
surveillance of surgeons’ performance (Anon, 2015; Bain and Taylor, 2000); this 
strategy might be effective than overt cost control. Yet, there were also signs of 
divergence or perhaps more strictly path dependence (Greener, 2002) which reinforced 
distinctions, both geographically between cases and temporally with the status quo 
ante.  This was perhaps most evidence in the regulatory pillar. For example, the longer 
period of implementation in California, together with stronger organisational incentives, 
had perhaps led to an approach which integrated public reporting more closely with 
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organisational system and processes. The evidence from the English case-study 
suggested this integration was still nascent. This might reflect the sense in which 
external agents (in the English case) were more hesitant in challenging surgeon’s (poor) 
performance and/or the strength of professional control in the nature and content of 
public reporting. 
 
In summary, the `pillars framework’ are a useful heuristic device to demonstrate how the 
behavioral and policy responses to public reporting by health system stakeholders are 
shaped by the nature of public reporting and the context into which it is implemented. 
The responses also shaped dynamically by subsequent iterations of public reporting, 
most evidently in California. These interactions between cardiac surgeons, 
organisational interests, and health system imperatives show the far-reaching effects 
that public reporting has had and continues to have. As a result, on-going divergence 





Public reporting is likely to remain an important aspect of all health systems but will be 
shaped by a health system’s own imperative and approach to transparency. Despite 
strong imperatives towards convergence, the context of each health system matters. 
Analyses need therefore to be sensitive to the context-specific factors of each system in 
framing the interaction between their regulatory, normative and cultural factors. These 
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factors will both shape and are shaped by actors’ decisions and behaviours. This 
interaction will also be framed by the extent of policy learning between health systems. 
Specifically, the American approach to public reporting has been instrumental to 
approaches in England. Whilst international comparative studies (such as this) help 
illuminate the impact of such intersections (Dolowitz et al, 1999), policy learning will also 
reflect the ways in which actors `piece together’ various aspects of information and 
experience into their system-specific approach (Freeman, 2007).   
 
Whilst greater transparency is a laudable objective for any health system, it is not clear 
that public reporting will necessarily be as effective as its proponents intended.  Alone, it 
will not act as sufficient stimulus to restore trust in and reputations of the medical 
profession, to enable to patient decision-making, or to enable quality improvement. 
Indeed, the growing need for cost savings in all health systems may lessen the salience 
and impact of public reporting. Yet, public reporting is re-shaping the surgical profession 
itself and the relations between surgeons and their organisations, and their patients.  
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